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TAKING CARE
KATHERINE M. FRANKE*
Care must be taken when human needs are expressed in the odd
dialect of legal rights. This delicate act of translation -from private
need to public obligation-demands acute sensitivity to the ways in
which public responsibility inaugurates a new and complex encounter
with a broad array of public preferences that deprive dependent
subjects of primary stewardship over the ways in which their needs
are met. Both Martha Fineman and Joan Williams have taken on the
difficult project of making the ethical and political case for
transforming dependency and care -from private or domestic need to
public responsibility. In the articles they have contributed to this
Symposium they both make significant contributions to this political
project, building on the substantial work they have done elsewhere.1
In Contract and Care,2 Martha Fineman introduces something
new to advance her now well-known thesis of collective responsibility
for both inevitable and derivative dependency.3 Drawing from
principles of private contract law as well as political social contract
theory, she argues that "[u]sing the idea of background conditions
[borrowed from contract law] it is possible to argue that it is time to
rewrite our social contract, to reconsider the viability and equity of
our existing social configurations and assumptions. '4 The back-
ground assumptions that Fineman seeks to unsettle are those that
take for granted that responsibility for dependency be delegated to
the family and that the family be constructed as a quintessentially
private institution. The privatization of dependency is possible,
according to Fineman, when dependency is characterized as a set of
* Professor of Law and Codirector of the Center for the Study of Law and Culture,
Columbia University Law School.
1. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2000); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (1999) [hereinafter
Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths].
2. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403 (2001).
3. For definitions of inevitable and derivative dependency, see id. at 1409 & nn.15-16.
4. Id. at 1431.
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"natural" needs, the family is constructed as an "organic" unit of
human organization, and further, the family is treated as an
economically independent unit-separate from the market and the
state.' Fineman has persuasively demonstrated how these fictions are
radically untrue of actual social organizations, while they nevertheless
undergird social policies that justify a minor public role in
dependency care. Indeed, the failure to address human dependency
adequately is most often attributed to private, not public,
irresponsibility.6
With Contract and Care, Fineman seeks to make a break with
this tradition by including a baseline of dependency needs within the
ambit of the rights of citizenship, "no less important and worthy of
governmental protection than civil and political rights."'7  The
normative justification for this claim rests on the notion that
dependency work is society-preserving work, and thus society owes a
debt to those who perform this essential public function, similar to the
collective obligation we feel toward those who secure our national
security by serving in the military.8
Similarly, market actors are not excused from accepting some
responsibility for the costs of dependency. With this article, Fineman
seeks to illuminate the degree to which the relationship between
employers and workers has become a virtual contract of adhesion-
take it or leave it-on terms that are highly unfavorable to workers,
and that ignore workers as full social beings whose working lives
cannot be disaggregated from the complex webs of dependency in
their lives.9 Thus, Fineman seeks to shift some of the costs of
dependency to market actors as a matter of (re)distributive justice
and worker security.
Joan Williams's project is no less substantial than Fineman's, but
is more targeted in its aim. While Williams's larger project is
designed to reshape what she calls the work/family axis so as to make
wage/labor work more compatible with most workers' care
obligations, 10 her contribution to this Symposium examines the
5. FINEMAN, supra note 1, at 190-91.
V. )ee, v.g., U .%.. v o0 kupp. iv Y7") (originaly enacted as Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105,
2113).
7. Fineman, supra note 2, at 1437.
8. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 1, at 16-19.
9. Fineman, supra note 2, at 1432-34.
10. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
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concept of domesticity and its relationship to gender identity
formation. Just as Fineman introduces social contract theory in a
novel way in Contract and Care, Williams draws from recent
sociological"l and gender performance theory12 to elaborate a concept
of gender as tradition.
Using the idea of gender as tradition, Williams seeks to elaborate
a concept of domesticity that provides the normative sites in which
particularly salient subject positions emerge that do the work of
gendering females and males into traditional roles of primary
caregiver/breadwinner. Williams's aim with this article is to
"democratize domesticity" both within and without the family. She
aims to break apart gendered caregiving roles in the family by
analogizing these roles to a kind of drag performance, while urging a
transformation of the ways in which the workplace is organized so
that it can accommodate adults who have caregiving responsibilities
at home.
In many respects Fineman and Williams share a descriptive
project: they are concerned about the privatization of dependency/
caregiving as an individual responsibility. They both set their sights
on the practices of rule imposed by the law of the private family and
seek to unsettle those practices with new paradigms of rule and
responsibility. Their prescriptive projects, however, look quite
different: Fineman seeks to enlist state and market actors in the task
of meeting inevitable dependency needs by radically reorganizing the
institutional sites in which dependency is addressed. Included in this
project is a quite novel rethinking of the nuclear family.13 Williams,
on the other hand, is rather happy with the nuclear family as the
institution in which caregiving takes place. She prefers to redistribute
responsibilities and resources both at home and at work so that
women and men can balance both work and family in a more
equitable way.
Both projects make important contributions toward a
reconceptualization of the ways in which dependency and caregiving
are addressed as both a private and a public manner. And both
projects suggest a theory of personal and civic sovereignty that to
date has been denied to those who have been responsible for the care
11. Williams draws from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. See Joan Williams, From Difference
to Dominance to Domesticity: Care As Work, Gender As Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441
(2001).
12. In this respect, Williams relies on the work of Judith Butler. See id.
13. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 1.
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of others, a class overwhelmingly made up of women. In a sense,
Fineman and Williams, following a long feminist tradition, are using
law to breathe political life into second-class cultural subjects. This
transformation from natural identity (natural mother), to culturally
constructed role (domesticity understood as embodying gender roles),
to empowered legal subject is a familiar liberal, rights-based
trajectory pursued in many modern civil rights movements.
It is important to recognize, however, just how law generally, and
rights specifically, insert themselves in these projects, in the name of
affording women and other caregivers greater liberty and agency. 14
The granting of rights and the recognition of public responsibility for
dependancy is unlikely to usher in a domain of unrestrained
autonomy that some liberal projects promise. Rather, to shift
responsibility for dependency outside the family is to exchange one
practice of rule-the private family-for another set of regulatory
governance practices, those imbued in the state and the market.
While the logic of the private family is worthy of the exacting critique
Fineman, Williams, and others 5 have given it, these projects must be
accompanied by an illumination of the rationalities of rule that come
along with market and state responsibility for what was previously
constructed as a purely private problem.
To shake the foundations of this private, political, and economic
tradition by inviting greater involvement from both state and market
actors is to simultaneously enable new opportunities for subjectivity
and for subjection. Specifically, through history, the way that the
state constitutes caring relationships is closely related to the manner
in which citizenship is constituted. The linking of citizenship and
dependency can be empowering, as Fineman notes, 6 but it is not a
strategy without potential costs. Indeed, the effects of public
responsibility for meeting individual need are not in our control and,
historically, come at a price. In the remainder of my Commentary, I
will discuss an earlier moment in U.S. history when public
responsibility for dependency was asserted at precisely the same
14. See generally Rende R6mkens, Law As a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of
Rights-Based Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming
2001).
15. See CIRCLES OF CARE: WORK AND IDENTITY IN WOMEN'S LIVES (Emily K. Abel &
Margaret K. Nelson eds., 1990); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN,
EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL
ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993).
16. "This responsibility marks a right of citizenship no less important and worthy of
governmental protection than civil and political rights." Fineman, supra note 2, at 1437.
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moment that African Americans were constituted as political and
legal rights-bearing subjects. Not surprisingly, this public concern for
dependency did not take the form preferred by the freed men and
women; 7 rather, it was expressed as part of a larger project of
governance undertaken in the service of twin goals: rebuilding the
South and cultivating citizenship in the newly freed people. This
historical example provides an interesting site to examine the
intersecting projects elaborated in Fineman's and Williams's
contributions to this Symposium. The reconstructed government that
enabled greater autonomy and liberty for African Americans -in the
name of newly granted citizenship - operationalized the normative
expectations of citizenship by regulating African American families
and testing their ability to "manage dependency." This historical
example demonstrates how new opportunities for political identity
and for agency cannot be analyzed apart from how power is
organized, 18 since new political identities are most certainly the
"effects of rule."'19
The period in which African Americans entered the U.S. civil
polity as citizens was, most assuredly, among the most complex
periods of state (re)formation in the nation's history. The
enumeration and enforcement of civil rights for freed men and
women, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1866,20 played a central
role in the creation of legal and political identities for African
American people. But these political identities-as freedpeople-
were not self-executing upon the ratification of the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, African Americans' status as
citizens was an identity to be managed by various public and private
actors in the immediate postbellum period. "Being a free citizen, he
must act as one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them, as well
17. Indeed, many would have settled for forty acres and a mule and being left alone by
white people altogether. See WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION 327
(1964). Freedmen's Bureau agents often reported that the freedmen were refusing to enter into
labor contracts with white planters because they believed that by late 1865 or early 1866 the
federal government would divide up and distribute Southern plantations to freedmen in forty
acre lots. This belief was so widespread that the Freedmen's Bureau was forced to issue a
formal notice correcting this misimpression and ordering freed men and women to enter into
labor contracts, as "it is in their best interest to look to the property holders for employment."
General 0.0. Howard, Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, Circular Letter (Nov. 11,
1865), RG 826, Roll 29, National Archives.
18. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM,
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 20 (2001).
19. DAVID SCOTT, REFASHIONING FUTURES: CRITICISM AFTER POSTCOLONIALITY 25
(1999).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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as enjoying the privileges of his new condition," 21 cautioned the chief
judge of the Georgia Supreme Court in 1881. Similarly, Freedmen's
Bureau agents were "instructed to act as General Counsellors for the
Freed-people within their respective districts, and to give them such
advice as will tend most to their ultimate good, and make them
honest and upright citizens. 2 2  As I have discussed elsewhere,
conformance with late-nineteenth-century marital norms was
regarded by both Freedmen's Bureau agents and local Southern
officials as one of the principal ways in which the freed men and
women could be civilized and prepared for the demands of
citizenship.23
Thus, for African Americans in this era, the transition from
enslavement to freedom and citizenship meant a shift in the domain
of personal governance, from that of an owner to that of the state.
Indeed, rather than securing a domain of autonomy and freedom
from government regulation, inclusion into the domain of rights as
citizens signified a "politico-ethical project of producing subjects and
governing their conduct. '' 24 What form did this take for African
Americans in the postbellum era? How were family and parenting
part of this politico-ethical project? After addressing these two
questions, I will conclude with some reflections on why this history
matters for Fineman's and Williams's contemporary projects.
As Union troops moved through the South, enslaved people fled
their owners for the protection of refugee camps, or "contraband
camps" as they were called at the time,21 in order to gain their liberty
and the protection of Northern troops.26 The destitution, disease, and
need of these people, freed by circumstance, was overwhelming.
21. Williams v. Georgia, 67 Ga. 260, 263 (1881) (emphasis added).
22. Office of Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands, Circular No. 6, Tallahassee, Fla. (Apr. 3, 1866), RG 105, M 826, Roll 28, National
Archives.
23. See Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999).
24. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 52.
25. Notwithstanding the fact that the Fugitive Slave Act remained good law until mid-1864,
Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200 (repealing "the Fugitive Slave Act of eighteen
hundred and fifty, and all Acts and Parts of Acts for the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves"), it was
federal policy well before that time to treat escaped slaves as "contrabands" recognizine their
status in-between confiscated property and human refugees. In May 1861, General Benjamin
Butler declared fugitive slaves "contrabands," on the ground that the Fugitive Slave Act did not
apply in a foreign country-Virginia. See The Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, 8 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 626, 627 (1861); see also LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG 52-53
(1979); VERNON LANE WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI, 1865-1890, at 23-25 (1947).
26. See W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen's Bureau, 87 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 354,
354-55 (1901).
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Henry Rowntree, a representative of the federal agency hastily
formed to address the needs of indigent black people, described the
living conditions of various freedpeople at Vicksburg, Mississippi, in
the spring of 1864 as follows:
I called at a cattle shed without any siding, there huddled together
were 35 poor wretchedly helpless negros, one man who had lost one
eye entirely, and the sight of the other fast going, he could do
nothing.
Five women all Mothers, and the residue of 29 children, all small
and under 12 years of age. One of the Women had the small pox,
her face a perfect mass of Scabs, her children were left uncared for
except for what they incidentally [received]. Another woman was
nursing a little boy about 7 whose earthly life was fast ebbing away,
she could pay but little attention to the rest of her family. Another
was scarcely able to crawl about.
They had no bedding. Two old quilts and a soldiers old worn out
blanket comprised the whole for 35 human beings. I enquired how
they slept, they collect together to keep one another warm and then
throw the quilts over them. There is no wood for them nearer than
half a mile which these poor children have to toat as they could
carry, hence they have a poor supply and the same with water, this
has be carried the same distance and the only vessel they had to
carry it in was a heavy 2 gallon stone jug, a load for a child when
empty.
They owned One Pan, and one Iron kettle amongst them, they had
no tin cup, no crockery of any kind, no knives or forks, and
certainly were the poorest off, of any I have met with being
litterally and truthfully destitute in every sense of the word.27
This description was not atypical of the living conditions of the
formally enslaved people who had escaped behind Union lines.
"Freedom" delivered cold comfort to those formerly enslaved people
who sought the aid of federal officers at the end of the war. As the
federal government deliberated over how to handle the sizable
population of freed men and women, managing dependency stood out
as the paramount problem to be addressed. The Contraband Relief
Commission, and its postwar successor, the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, took as their primary charge the
27. Letter from Henry Rowntree to Contraband Relief Commission, Jefferson Davis
Mansion (Apr. 13, 1864), RG 105, Entry 2150, at 10-11, National Archives. Rowntree's work
documenting the state of the freed men and women is notable as he was employed both by the
Contraband Relief Society of Cincinnati and the Society of Friends-private relief and
missionary organizations that worked hand in hand with the nascent public relief agencies to
rebuild the South after the war. See also JAMES E. YEATMAN, WESTERN SANITARY COMM'N,
A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE FREEDMEN OF THE MISSISSIPPI (1864) (containing a
report dated Dec. 17, 1863, describing the destitute conditions of freedmen throughout
Mississippi).
20011 1547
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"problem" of eliminating African Americans' dependency upon the
public fisc. 2s Lurking behind the Commission's/Bureau's work was
the shibboleth: "a Nigger won't work without whipping." 9 When the
American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission toured the South holding
hearings in order to establish the best ways of addressing the
freedmen's transition from slavery to freedom, virtually the first
question asked of every white witness was, "What do you think of the
capability of the slaves of this state to take care of themselves?"3 0
Nearly every black witness before the Commission was queried about
his or her capacity for self-support." For even the most progressive
reformers of the era, freedom and citizenship for African Americans
meant self-sufficiency, not dependency. These performative
injunctions were issued nearly universally, notwithstanding the well-
known absence of resources in the African American community.
"They must remember that they cannot have rights without duties.
Freedom does not mean the right to live without work at other
people's expense but means that each man shall enjoy the fair fruits
of his labor.... No really respectable person wishes to be supported
by others. '3 2
The project we know as Reconstruction had as one of its central
aims the reconfiguration of African Americans from nonagentic,
28. Consider this example of one tactic employed by these organizations to force the newly
freed people into self-sufficiency:
There being a large accumulation of Negroes at this post, depending upon the
Government for support, and this course of idleness being prejudicial to the interest of
the Government, the community and themselves, it is hereby ordered:
That they return to their former homes, or seek employment elsewhere .... They
will be given ten days to obtain employment, and provide for their own
subsistence; at which time the issue of rations will be discontinued.
General Order No. 2, Col. G.M.L. Johnson, Headquarters Post, Columbus, Miss. (June 7, 1865),
RG 826, Roll 3, National Archives.
29. See, e.g., Letter from Col. J.L. Haynes to Capt. B.F. Morey, Vicksburg, Miss. (July 8,
1865), RG 826, Roll 11, at 2, National Archives.
30. See Testimony of George W. Fishback to the American Freedmen's Inquiry
Commission, St. Louis, Mo., Nov.-Dec. 1863, RG 94, M 619, Roll 201, at 141, National
Archives. Testimonies before this Inquiry Commission were collected in November and
December of that year, throughout Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. See id.
31. Id.; Testimony of Colored Man (name unknown) to the American Freedmen's Inquiry
Commission, St. Louis, Mo., Nov.-Dec. 1863, RG 94, M 619, Roll 201, at 81, National Archives
("It is a mistaken idea that the black people cannot take care of themselves."); Testimony of
Charlotte Buriis to the Amcrican Freedmen's inquiry Commission, St. Louis, Mo., Nov.-Dec.
1863, RG 94, M 619, Roll 201, at 84, National Archives ("We have never been dependent; we
have never been troublesome to anybody. If it is little, we have enough, and are satisfied with
what we have."); see also Franke, supra note 23, at 302-03.
32. Office of Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands, Circular No. 4, Vicksburg, Miss. (July 29, 1865), RG 826, Roll 28, frame 259, National
Archives.
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nonsubjects who had been governed by the absolute will of their
owners, to agentic, legal subjects whose entry into the domain of
citizenship and rights ushered in a new relationship to the state.
Among the top priorities of Reconstruction reformers was the use of
law to achieve new habits of social discipline in the freedmen. I have
written elsewhere about the priority of the institution of marriage in
this politico-socio-legal project.3 While it was surely of utmost
importance to African Americans to have their marital and familial
bonds respected by the state, the state's recognition of the integrity of
the African American family was motivated, in significant part, by a
desire to privatize dependency. 34 By installing the husband as the
head of the family and the fiscal sovereign of his family, the state
absolved itself of responsibility for the costs of care of needy women
and children. This move to shore up the black family and, in so
doing, insulate the public from responsibility for black poverty was
justified as a necessary component of the responsibilities of
citizenship and freedom. In this respect, the Supreme Court's odious
claim that in 1883 freed men and women should "cease[] to be the
special favorite of the laws, ' 35 merely echoed the double bind of
freedom for African Americans that Saidiya Hartman has termed
"burdened individuality," 36 whereby the granting of social and legal
rights "resulted in the paradoxical construction of the freed both as
self-determining and enormously burdened individuals and as
members of a population whose productivity, procreation, and sexual
practices were fiercely regulated and policed."'3
This turn to privatize black dependency occurred at precisely the
same time, however, that a public stake in the well-being of poor
black children was asserted by Southern white officials. Throughout
33. See Franke, supra note 23.
34. See Ariela R. Dubler, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886-87 (1998).
35. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected.
Id.
36. SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-
MAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 117 (1997) (defining "burdened individuality" as
the state of "being freed from slavery and free of resources, emancipated and subordinated, self-
possessed and indebted, equal and inferior, liberated and encumbered, sovereign and
dominated, citizen and subject").
37. Id.
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the South, legislatures enacted apprenticeship laws that permitted, or
in some states required, local officials to remove a child from the
home of an African American family when the child's parents did not
have the means to support the child. These black children were to be
apprenticed to a suitable person. 3 When parents were found to be
paupers,39 were not habitually employed in some honest, industrious
occupation, 4° were deemed to be of notoriously bad character, 41 or
where it was determined that it would simply be better for the habits
and comfort of a child, 42 a court could or was required to order that a
minor child be bound out as an apprentice to some white person,
often the family's former owner,43 until the child reached the age of
majority."4
Freedmen's Bureau agents were swamped with disputes
involving the apprenticing of African American children. It was not
uncommon for children to be bound out to white planters without
their parents' knowledge, as in some jurisdictions all the notice they
were entitled to was posting notices in five public places and calling
the parents' name three times at the courthouse door.45 Even with
notice, freed men and women frequently lost custody of their children
regardless of the parents' ability to support them. In December 1865,
Nelson Gill, subcommissioner for the Mississippi Freedmen's Bureau,
wrote to his command that
I think the apprenticeship act is being used here to the injury of the
Freedmen. For instance yesterday a woman complained to me that
3& See, e.g., Registers of Indentures of Colored Orphans, Aug. 1865-May 1866, at
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/mississippi/orphans.htm (last visited June 5, 2001).
39. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 86, 86-90 (regulating the "relation
of Master and Apprentice, as relates to Freedmen, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes").
40. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, § 15, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, 104-05.
41. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 291-304 (establishing and regulating
"the Domestic Relations of Persons of Color" and amending "the law in relation to Paupers and
Vagrancy").
42. See MD. CODE ANN. art. VI, § 31 (1860) (regarding apprentices).
43. See, e.g., ch. 5, 1865 Miss. Laws at 86.
44. On the apprentice system in Mississippi, see generally NORALEE FRANKEL,
FREEDOM'S WOMEN: BLACK WOMEN AND FAMILIES IN CIVIL WAR ERA MISSISSIPPI 138-45
(1999).
45. Id. at 138; see also Letter from Thomas A. Magee, Probate Judge, Franklin County,
Miss., to Capt. Platt, Freedmen's Bureau, Franklin County, Miss. (July 14, 1866), RG 826, Roll
14, at 3-4, National Archives (regarding apprenticeship of Virginia Cain's two sons to their
former master over the objections of their mother).
Proof of posting [notice of the apprenticeship hearing] was made, and she was call [sic]
at the courthouse door by the proper officer three times & failing to come forward and
contest Mr. Cain's application and he having in all respects conformed to the
requirements of the statute in such cases, these minors were apprenticed to him.
[Vol. 76:1541
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her daughter had been taken from her and bound to her former
owner till she is 18. The woman complaining is young and able
bodied. The girl is her only child and is 12 years old and will hire
readily for more than her support. The girl was bound on the
ground that her mother had not the means to support her the falsity
of which was proven by the man to whom the girl was bound
offering the mother (in court) good wages if she would go and work
for him. The mother [slays she could not live with (the former
owner) because he always abused her and she is very much grieved
by the fear that he will misuse her daughter. 6
In this case, the Freedmen's Bureau agent reported that the family
depended upon the daughter's wages for their collective support, thus
her removal from the home rendered the entire family substantially
worse off. Nevertheless, the law allowed the judge to remove the
child even without parental consent.4 7 The agent wrote to the judge
who ordered the apprenticeship "protesting against it on the ground
that the mother was not proven unable to support her child," but
obtained no results.48
In addition to the apprenticeship laws enacted during this period,
Southern legislatures passed a number of laws regulating the "free"
labor of the freedmen. Known as the "contract labor" system,
African Americans, now free, were allowed to alienate their own
labor for a wage, but according to highly restrictive terms, set first by
the Freedmen's Bureau and then by state law. While the details of
the contract labor system varied by locality, in most jurisdictions
freed men and women were required to be under contract at all times;
if found without a signed contract, they could be, and usually were,
prosecuted for vagrancy-a crime that could put them in jail and
thereby make them subject to the convict leasing system. 49 Typically,
the Freedmen's Bureau, state law, or local custom required that
freedmen enter into labor contracts for a term of one year and that
their wages would be paid out of the profits from the harvest at the
end of the year. In bad growing years, this meant that laborers were
paid last, and often not at all; and the years immediately following the
war tragically saw periods of drought and heavy rain, as well as
inundations of army worm, all of which devastated the cotton crop. 0
46. Letter from Nelson G. Gill, Office of Assistant Commissioner Freedmen's Bureau, to
Lt. E. Barnberger, Holly Springs, Miss. (Dec. 20, 1865), RG 826, Roll 11, at 2-3, National
Archives (emphasis altered).
47. On the issue of consent, see WHARTON, supra note 25, at 84.
48. Letter from Nelson G. Gill, supra note 46, at 3.
49. See generally Mary Church Terrell, Peonage in the United States: The Convict Lease
System and the Chain Gangs, 62 NINETEENTH CENTURY & AFTER 306 (1907).
50. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
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Notwithstanding the otherwise unfavorable contracts that freed men
and women were forced to sign, Freedmen's Bureau agents and local
officials often required that planters take on a contractual obligation
to provide food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies for their
workers and their families. Miles Hampton's contract to work for
A.P. Morrow included language that the employer "is to furnish said
Freedman with plenty of good and substantial food to eat and a home
to stay in and with medicines and medical attention during reasonable
sickness free of charge to them."'" In this sense, Joan Williams would
be pleased to see that the contract labor system included a
recognition of the dependency needs of African American laborers.
Not surprisingly, the contractual obligations of private market
actors to assume the costs of African Americans' dependency were
observed most often in the breach.52 What is more, the interests of
planters to reduce their labor costs served to fuel a convergence of
interests with state actors who sought to enforce marriage laws
against the newly freed men and women. Government officials
repeatedly voiced the view that "one of the first things to be done
with these people, to qualify them for citizenship, for self-protection
and self-support, is to impress upon them the family obligations."53
John Eaton, the official designated by General Grant in 1862 to set
up "contraband camps" in Mississippi and Tennessee in order to
handle the most urgent needs of fleeing former slaves, observed:
"Among the things to be done, to fit the freed people for a life of
happiness and usefulness, it was obvious that the inculcation of right
principles and practices in regard to the social relations ought to find
a place. '5 4 Thus, while the right to marry was among the most
cherished rights afforded the newly freed men and women incident to
freedom, marriage was also explicitly regarded by state and federal
1863-1877, at 140-42 (1988); JANET SHARP HERMANN, THE PURSUIT OF A DREAM 131-34
(1981).
51. Contract between Miles Hampton and A.P. Morrow, Columbus County, Miss. (Jan. 1,
1866), RG 105, Box 39, Misc. Papers, National Archives. In exchange for one year's labor by
Miles, his wife Milly, and their two sons Elijah and Monroe, Morrow agreed to pay four
hundred dollars ($4,312.67 in today's dollars); however, wages would be deducted for the time
that any of them were sick and unable to work. Id.
52. Miles Hampton's contract appears in the Freedmen's Bureau records together with
other sir contracts appended to a file entitled "Claims against A.P. Morrow." Many
freedmen, including Hampton, filed complaints against Morrow with the Freedmen's Bureau
because he failed to pay any wages to the people in his employ. Id.
53. Testimony of Col. William A. Pile, to the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission,
St. Louis, Mo., Nov.-Dec. 1863, RG 94, M 619, Roll 201, at 123, frame 139, National Archives.
54. Report of John Eaton, General Superintendent of Freedmen, Department of
Tennessee (Apr. 29, 1863), RG 94, M 619, Roll 200, at 89-90, National Archives.
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officials as the institutional site in which freedmen could be civilized
and prepared for citizenship.
At the same time, planters sought to enforce marriage laws
against African Americans for other, more material, reasons. While
they somewhat begrudgingly agreed to take on the costs of supporting
their workers' dependents, they sought to cut off the extent of these
obligations by forcing their male workers to marry and thereby limit
their obligations to a much smaller group of "legal" relatives.
"Planters say, that they cannot, even if they would, support so large a
number of non-producers," wrote one bureau agent in 1865. 55
"[M]any of the planters who have lost the male hands from their
place threaten to turn off the women and children who will become a
burden to the community. '5 6 While freed men and women regarded
their support obligations to run to much broader kinship network
than that plotted by Victorian marriage laws, planters preferred to
use a narrow, positive legal definition of marriage to minimize their
contractual duties of care.
While the refusal of white planters to contribute to the well-
being of the freedmen comes as no surprise to any scholar of the
family, I provide these examples to help enrich our understanding of
Fineman's and Williams's contributions to this Symposium. First, on
more than one occasion I longed for Williams's article, in particular,
to be situated within an historical context. Her analysis of
domesticity speaks, at best, to the experiences of white men and
women of a particular class.57 The work/family axis of few, if any,
African American women in the nineteenth century fits the
description Williams provides.
Secondly, the experiences of African American families in the
immediate postbellum period illustrates how performance has always
55. Report of Thomas Smith Chaplain, Subcommissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, to
Capt. J.H. Weber, Jackson, Miss. (Nov. 3, 1865), RG 826, Roll 12, National Archives.
56. Report of Col. J.L. Haynes to Capt. B.F. Morey (July 8, 1865), RG 826, Roll 10,
National Archives.
57. Williams, supra note 11, at 1444-45. In addition, I found it curious that Williams draws
a distinction between the manner in which gender and race are constitutive of identity. "But
gender is different from racism in that it marries oppressive social patterns with elements of
what we like about ourselves and want to keep, such as the structure of the erotic or our dreams
for our children." Id. at 1484. First, it strikes me that the proper comparison is gender and race,
or sexism and racism, but not gender and racism. But even if the analogy she seeks to reference
is gender and race, surely there are aspects of racial identity and meaning that individuals
treasure, despise, embrace, and resist, just as Williams claims we do with gender. The
distinction she draws also creates a false sense that gender has a lot to do with the erotic, while
race (or racism?) contributes nothing to this important dimension of human experience. See,
e.g., BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 57-64 (1990).
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been a part of civic subjectivity. Williams might call it "citizenship in
drag," but the historical evidence demonstrates quite clearly how
African Americans were recognized as rights holders only to the
extent that they performed what David Scott calls "'responsibilized'
freedom. 58  In this sense, freed men and women became viable
social, political, and legal subjects by and through their compliance
with the regulatory regimes imposed by and through law-it was law
generally and rights specifically that imposed the disciplinary
framework that made this subjectivity possible for African
Americans. To understand subjectivity performatively is not to
undertake a kind of trendy humanism, whereby black people are seen
as choosing subjects who don the drag of the citizen each day. This is
the critical misreading of Judith Butler's work that she sought to
clarify in Bodies That Matter.59
While surely the pressing needs of African Americans during the
immediate postwar period justified public responsibility for the costs
of meeting those needs,6° then, as now, the state stepped in not only
with economic resources, but with its own agendas and priorities
about how dependency should be managed. The structural supports
provided to freed men, women, and children during this period took
on the odor of a colonial encounter, not unlike that which
characterized other sorts of structural adjustments undertaken in
other contexts in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. My
point is not only about strings being attached, but implicates deeper
issues concerning the kinds of dependency that the public is willing to
recognize, as well as the kinds of subjectivity that public responsibility
58. ScOTT, supra note 19, at 87.
59. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIEs THAT MATTER, at x (1993). I fear that Williams has herself
engaged in this misreading of performativity in her use of Butler's work. Her deployment of the
idea that "one performs pursuant to a script," Williams, supra note 11, at 1482, and that gender
and domesticity are similar to a jazz performance, leave open the question of the subject who is
performing the script or playing the music. For Williams, this subject seems to be "mothers," a
set of social subjects who are handed a repertoire of familiar roles and riffs to play, and Williams
wants to propose for mothers a new, more egalitarian, score. But this is to reproduce the error
that Butler cautioned against in Bodies That Matter. For Butler, the subject emerges as a result
of a ritualized reiteration of norms; there is no subjectivity prior to the performance, as the
subject is the residue or detritus, if you will, of the performance itself. To my mind, Patriarchy
Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1973 (1995), represents a classic and elaborate example of the kind of misreading of Butler
that Williams reproduces in her use of domesticity as drag. In the end, the subject of Williams's
humanist project-mother-deserves robust critical attention in feminism theory, a project I
have sought to take up elsewhere. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (2001).
60. This issue is, of course, separate from the important question of reparations owed to
formerly enslaved people.
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produces. In this respect, two public projects were mutually and
interdependently at stake in the state's recognition of the dependency
needs of African Americans in the immediate postbellum period:
civilizing, or making ready, the freed men and women for citizenship
and producing a cheap source of labor to perform the agricultural
work previously done by enslaved men and women. These agendas
were operationalized explicitly and coercively through the consti-
tution of legally regulated institutions in which black freedom could
take place. The family was among the principal sites in which the
protocitizen could be disciplined, and the "problem" of dependency
could be leveraged to satisfy the labor demands of the rebuilding
South.61
In this sense, African American subjectivity was possible only to
the extent that one was willing to be subjected to the discipline the
law imposed in virtually every aspect of life. Louis Althusser's notion
of interpellation is particularly helpful in understanding what freedom
meant for freed men and women. One is interpellated as a subject
when, according to Althusser, 62 an individual is "hailed" by law or
legal authority, for instance, when a police officer hails: "Hey, you
there!" For Althusser, when the individual recognizes that it is she
who is being hailed, she chooses to turn around; choosing to turn
around, she submits to the authority of the hailing. In these
productive moments of cultural call and response, a legal subject is
created and recognized. In myriad ways, postbellum legal authority
called African American subjectivity into being through a reiterative
process of power and submission: freed men and women became
husbands and wives by conforming their familial lives to the rules of
marriage, and one was treated as a free laborer so long as one worked
according to the regulatory demands of the contract labor system.
The experiences of African Americans during this period are
instructive on many levels, but for present purposes they may help us
to think through the utility of social contract theory in projects
designed to advance social justice. Fineman observes that "the state
may have a responsive or regulating role to play in regard to
61. As I have discussed elsewhere, the enforcement of bigamy, adultery, and fornication
laws rather aggressively against African American people, particularly men, served the purpose
of populating postbellum prisons with black men who were then leased by the state to planters
to perform the agricultural work previously done by slaves. See Franke, supra note 23, at 305-
07.
62. See, e.g., Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 121, 127-28, 164-70 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).
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change," 63 and "[t]he government has a crucial and nondelegatable
responsibility to secure that [basic] goods are delivered independent
of the market value of any individual labor. This responsibility marks
a right of citizenship." 64  Yet to successfully invoke a right of
citizenship does not usher in a domain of freedom that flourishes in
the absence of state power. Freedom, like markets or "free trade,"6
is not what is left when state power recedes, but instead is a domain,
the bounds, terms, and coherence of which, are the product of state
power.
Social contract theory has never adequately accounted for the
way in which the citizen's engagement with the state is itself
productive: of citizenship, of legal and cultural subjectivity, and of
political presence. This is not to say that we should abandon a
critique of the "deal" we are provided by the state when it purports to
be looking after its citizens. 66 But rather, the critical project must
expose our relationship to the state to a kind of scrutiny that unpacks
the way in which the state is doing more than naming needs when it
calls out: "Hey you, your needs are next on our agenda." It strikes
me as curious that the new scholarship of the family-a body of work
that seeks to enjoin greater state responsibility for the costs of
dependency-provides deep, innovative, and comprehensive critiques
of the "family," without providing either a theory or a critique of the
state. This project-reconceiving kinship, dependency, and care in
light of an explicitly feminist theory of the state 67 -remains to be
taken up by one or more of the many able minds working in this field.
That being said, we are all the beneficiaries of a paradigm shift
provoked by the contributions that Fineman and Williams have made
to the project of reconceptualizing the nature of dependency, the
places where it is addressed, and the responsibilities that we all share
in meeting those needs.
63. Fineman, supra note 2, at 1435.
64. Id. at 1437.
65. David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85-88 (2000).
66. In this regard, Fineman's analysis would be enhanced by the inclusion of feminist
critiques of social contract theory, such as, most prominently, that of Carole Pateman. See
generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACr (1988).
67. Judith Butler's Antigone's Claim begins to link issues of kinship to a critique of state
recognition by suggesting a "post-oedipal" subject. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE'S
CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH (2000).
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